Joint statement on the Ebola response and WHO reforms

Ebola Treatment Centre, Sierra LeoneStatement by WHO Director-General, Deputy Director-General and Regional Directors, on the Ebola outbreak and response, and reforms to the work of WHO in outbreaks and humanitarian emergencies. 1. The Ebola outbreak which started in Dec 2013 became a public health, humanitarian and socioeconomic crisis, with devastating impact on families, communities and affected countries. It also served as a reminder that the world, including WHO, is ill prepared for a large sustained disease outbreak.

2. We welcome the recommendations of the Special Session of the WHO Executive Board, in particular the proposed assessment of all aspects of the WHO response. Based on the lessons learnt, we commit ourselves to reforms that will enable WHO to play its rightful place in disease outbreaks, humanitarian emergencies and in global health security.

What have we learned?
3. We have learned lessons of humility. We have seen that old diseases in new contexts consistently spring new surprises. We have taken serious note of the criticisms of the Organization that, inter alia, the initial WHO response was slow and insufficient, we were not aggressive in alerting the world, our surge capacity was limited, we did not work effectively in coordination with other partners, there were shortcomings in risk communications, and there were was confusion of roles and responsibilities at the three levels of the Organization.

4. We have learned lessons of fragility. We have seen that health gains –fewer child deaths, malaria coming under control, more women surviving child birth – are all too easily reversed, when built on fragile health systems, which are quickly overwhelmed and collapse in the face of an outbreak of this nature.

5. We have learned the importance of capacity. We can mount a highly effective response to small and medium-sized outbreaks, but when faced with an emergency of this scale, our current systems – national and international – simply have not coped.

6. We have learned lessons of community and culture. A significant obstacle to an effective response has been the inadequate engagement with affected communities and families. This is not simply about getting the right messages across; we must learn to listen if we want to be heard. We have learned the importance of respect for culture in promoting safe and respectful funeral and burial practices. Empowering communities must be an action, not a cliché.

7. We have learned lessons of solidarity. In a disease outbreak, all are at risk. We have learned that that the global surveillance and response system is only as strong as its weakest links, and in an increasingly globalised world, a disease threat in one country is a threat to us all. Shared vulnerability means shared responsibility and therefore requires sharing of resources, and sharing of information.

8. We have learned the challenges of coordination. We have learnt to recognise the strengths of others, and the need to work in partnership when we don’t have the capacity ourselves.

9. We have been reminded that market-based systems do not deliver on commodities for neglected diseases – endemic nor epidemic. But we have been encouraged by the desire of the scientific community, manufacturers and regulators to work together in this crisis to develop effective diagnostics, drugs and vaccines for Ebola.

10. Finally, we have learned the importance of communication – of communicating risks early, of communicating more clearly what is needed, and of involving communities and their leaders in the messaging.

What must we do?
11. We will intensify our advocacy with national authorities to keep outbreak prevention and management at the top of national and global agendas.

12. We will develop the capacity to respond rapidly and effectively to disease outbreaks and humanitarian emergencies. This will require a directing and coordinating mechanism to bring together the world’s resources to mount a rapid and effective response. We commit to expanding our core staff working on diseases with outbreak potential and health emergencies so we will have at least [1,000] skilled staff always available at the three levels of WHO. We will also create surge capacity of teams of trained and certified staff so that we have at least [1000] additional staff available as a reserve force in the event of an emergency.

13. We will create a Global Health Emergency Workforce – combining the expertise of public health scientists, the clinical skills of doctors, nurses and other health workers, the management skills of logisticians and project managers, and the skills of social scientists, communication experts and community workers. This Global Health Emergency Workforce will be made up of teams of trained and certified responders who can available immediately. A key principle must be to build capacity in countries, with training and simulation exercises.

14. We will establish a Contingency Fund to enable WHO to respond more rapidly to disease outbreaks. We must ensure adequate resources – domestic and international – are available BEFORE the next outbreak. We welcome the proposal to create a pandemic financing facility.

15. We will change our way of working. Disease outbreaks demand a command and control approach – very different from the consensus building culture of most of our work in global public health. We commit to clarifying our roles and responsibilities within health emergencies, and organize ourselves to deliver on these roles. We will develop new systems for human resources, planning, logistics, information management and other areas that are so critically important in health emergencies.

16. We will establish partnerships with other organizations such as OCHA, UNICEF and WFP and other partners, to create a scalable operational response capacity for large scale disease outbreaks

17. We will strengthen the International Health Regulations – the international framework for preparedness, surveillance and response for disease outbreaks and other health threats. We commit to strengthening our capacity to assess, plan and implement preparedness and surveillance. We will scale up our support to countries to develop the minimum core capacities to implement the IHR. We will establish mechanisms for independent verification of national capacity to detect and respond to disease threats.

18. We will develop expertise in community engagement in outbreak preparedness and response. We will emphasise the importance of community systems strengthening and work with partners to develop multidisciplinary approaches to community engagement , informed by anthropology and other social sciences.

19. We will communicate better. We commit to provide information on disease outbreaks and other health emergencies as they occur, rapidly and transparently. We will strengthen our capacity for risk communications and for community engagement.

We call on world leaders to take the following steps
20. First, take disease threats seriously. We don’t know when the next major outbreak will come or what will cause it. But history tells us it will come.

21. Second, remain vigilant. This Ebola outbreak is far from over, and we must sustain our support to the affected countries until the outbreak is over, in the face of increasing complacency and growing fatigue. We must continue to maintain a high level of surveillance. Ebola has demonstrated its capacity to spread – it may do so again.

22. Third, engage to re-establish the services, systems and infrastructure which have been devastated in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. This recovery must be country-led, community-based, and inclusive – engaging the many partners who have something to contribute – bilateral and multilateral partners, national and international NGOs, the faith community, and the private sector.

23. Fourth, focus on prevention. This means investing domestically and internationally in essential public health systems for preparedness, surveillance and response, which are fully integrated and aligned with efforts to strengthen health systems, and included in the scope of development assistance for health. It means working across sectors – health and agriculture in particular. These resources will be substantial, but as the well-known aphorism goes, prevention is better (and less costly) than cure.

24. Fifth, be transparent in reporting. Accurate and timely information is the basis for effective action. Speedy detection facilitates speedy response and prevents escalation.

25. Sixth, invest in research and development for the neglected diseases with outbreak potential – diagnostics, drugs, and vaccines. This will require innovative financing mechanisms, and public-private partnerships.

26. Finally, hold us to account. We commit ourselves to ensuring that WHO is reformed and well positioned to play its rightful role in disease outbreaks and in global health security generally. Some have said the world needs a new organization to be created. We agree, and we want WHO to be that organization.

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